Cyber Security Articles

By Scott Gordon We’re living in a complicated time right now in terms of enabling a mobile workforce, securing endpoint
By Scott Totzke, CEO & Co-Founder, ISARA Corporation The dawn of the quantum computing era promises to fundamentally change the
Heading home from RSA 2018, my main reaction seems to be “wow!” What an incredible display of innovation and brainpower.
Are there hardware vulnerabilities in the electronics used by the U.S. Cyber Command? That is the question I posed to
cyber policy
Tech manifestos are often cringe-worthy acts of presumption, a harangue, a screech of superior attitude by people who haven’t earned
Would You Buy a Car with No Brakes? Me, neither. Yet, if we take a hard look at the many

Cyber Security Articles

What This Cyber Security Articles Page Is About

The goal of Journal of Cyber Policy is to provide commentary and stimulate conversations about important cyber security topics. Our parallel goal is to discuss cyber issues in plain English, liberating this critical subject from the exclusive realm of specialized engineers and hackers. Throughout, we try to talk about cyber security and related issues from the perspectives of public policy, national security, corporate policy and compliance.

 

Why Articles about Cyber Security Matter

We are living in an era where digital technology dominates so much of our lives. Digital risk naturally accompanies this reality. Smartphones, the IoT, the Internet and so forth make our lives easier, but they also expose us to threats. Some of these threats come from nation state actors. We believe Americans could be better-informed about these risks. And, while there’s certainly no lack of content online about cyberthreats, room still exists for cyber security articles that integrate the subject’s diverse themes of technology, politics and business.

For example, Russian disinformation and Chinese espionage are not new, but today’s digital landscape makes these familiar tactics deadly, in political terms. The Cold War was largely analog in nature, with offensive campaigns quite limited in scope and impact. While Cold War dynamics may survive today, they are having a radically different effect on American society and politics than anything that came before.

It can be tricky to tease out the differences between today and a generation ago. American politics and governance have always been messy, dishonest and idiotic, but there were at least some fact-based controls on it. This is no longer the case. Our enemies are exploiting this new reality. In some cases, they’ve created this new reality.

We see the impacts of these new measures, but leaders across the government and business sectors generally fail to understand the transformative nature of technology, e.g. Amazon is not just a bigger mail order store; the iPhone is not just a phone with fancy features, and so forth. These cognitive gaps lead to deficiencies in the perception of risk. They enable our leaders to underestimate our enemies and how they can win without firing a shot. We also tend to overestimate our defenses and resiliency.

The digitization of society, commerce and politics renders America defenseless in ways that we are only beginning to understand. Digital transformation is double edge. America’s rush to digitize its economy and society produces as much risk as it does benefits. For example, we have to manage the tensions between mobility and surveillance, between big data and privacy and so on.

The Topics We Cover in These Articles

We deal with a wide range of cyber security topics in these articles. Some discuss cyber election interference. Others look at geopolitical cyber risks, such as our recent series on Russian disinformation and “Active Measures.” We will frequently check in on the state of enterprise architecture and cloud computing, seeking expert insights into the best practices and new security technologies that are influencing security policies in these areas of information technology. We cover the gamut of security subjects: malware, phishing, identity and access management (IAM), privileged access management (PAM), zero trust, data security, application security, secure DevOps (DevSecOps), red-blue teaming, automation, Security Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR), threat monitoring, incident response, intrusion detection, encrypting, key management and on and on. Our cyber security articles look at compliance, government cybersecurity frames like NIST NSF, GDPR, CCPA and more.

Preserving Usability While Enforcing Access Compliance

By Scott Gordon

We’re living in a complicated time right now in terms of enabling a mobile workforce, securing endpoint devices and protecting access to sensitive corporate and consumer information. On one side of the equation, organizations are moving data into the cloud – public, private and Software as a Service (SaaS). On the other side, we’ve got the consumerization of IT with a big shift in the mobile endpoints and Internet-connected devices users are employing to access that data. The challenge becomes “How do we consistently enforce secure access policy, without negatively affecting usability and end user productivity?”

To put it another way, how can we protect the connection while adding fidelity to make informed decisions and have audit records showing that we’re following policy? This is one of the problems Pulse Secure is solving. Our role is to have the IT organization focus on how they can fortify new business initiatives and a mobile workforce, while extending protected and authenticated access from the endpoint of the user to the resource, in a way that preserves usability and enforces compliance.

This is a big issue if you’re a regulated business that wants to provide access to certain applications and information but doesn’t physically own the endpoint or wants to ensure specific use of corporate-provided devices. Could that device be misconfigured, introduce ransomware, inadvertently offer an unsanctioned app, or be susceptible to unauthorized access and data loss? How do you ensure that the right person gets access to the right information, that the communication session is protected and that user’s device is secure?

How do you ensure that the right person gets access to the right information, that the communication session is protected and that user’s device is secure?

If a company provides access to personal customer information through a critical application that resides with a cloud service provider, you may require that user identity and device security state be verified and that a Secure Sockets Layer virtual private network (SSL VPN) connection needs to be enforced whenever that application is used. At the same time, you want the mobile user to be redirected seamlessly to specific resources, but have the policy centralized, tracked and applied, regardless of user’s device of choice.

Our Pulse Connect Secure product can ensure an always-on virtual private network (VPN) connection or application-specific protected connection. In addition, our host checking functionality verifies that the endpoint is running certain applications and has up-to-date defenses, from antivirus to a personal firewall. We can check that corporate-owned devices have endpoint management software that is installed and active. We can even invoke remediation, such as triggering Microsoft SCCM, to remediate that endpoint. We let you define an endpoint compliance policy down to that level – the user identity, the group, the required device security state and response – depending on the scenario of what type of resources are to be accessed.

Pulse Secure ultimately provides organizations extensive visibility into users and devices to allow IT to make informed decisions and mitigate risk. Once you have this intelligence, you can align business requirements to security requirements, allowing you to preempt the impact on users. You can define the extent of user authentication, device inspection, endpoint compliance requirements and action that would be taken depending on the role and endpoint security state – whether the resource being requested is on the corporate network, in a private cloud or being served by a third-party SaaS application. They can be set up relative to the role of user and the information they want to access. These policies can be phased-in and matured as needed.

A Secure Access policy is typically based on who you are, what group you belong to, what kind of device you have, potentially your location, what resource you’re attempting to go to, the security state of your endpoint and the operational control over the endpoint. All those things can make up a compliance policy that can be triggered as soon as someone attempts to access a resource, whether they are remote or on a corporate network. The policy can also impose different access security conditions if the application or information is in a corporate data center or cloud-based. They key is to enable policy management that can consistently delivered across different user types, computing devices, applications and network resources.

A Secure Access policy is typically based on who you are, what group you belong to, what kind of device you have, potentially your location, what resource you’re attempting to go to, the security state of your endpoint and the operational control over the endpoint.

Pulse Secure achieves this for our customers by using open standards and proprietary methods that facilitate interoperability with a broad array of network, security and cloud-based operating environments. Imagine a remote user requires going to certain corporate applications and a few web applications hosted in a public cloud, the user would only need to authenticate once through our Pulse Secure client for all their access needs. We can use Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) protocol to federate and facilitate the authentication of that user to that cloud application. Our systems also work with commercial and government issued two-factor authentication systems to enable stronger, identity assurance.

Using standards, we can also ensure that non-employees attempting to access network resources, say through wireless controller, will also be managed. You can have visitors and contractors under specific guest policies where they have restricted access, if that’s the policy you define. For instance, a contractor could have restrictions on specific resource access that they need, set up in advance by an authorized employee sponsor. At the same time, general visitors can request access through a captive portal, where they will be put into a guest virtual LAN (VLAN), to segregate the employee network. This automated process to identify, classify and segregate guest users and their endpoints according to policy is also applied to unknown, internet-connected devices as a means of Internet-of-Things (IoT) security.

Secure access capabilities can also be applied to state and federal government to meet their requirements. We’re used by some of the largest cities, where public servants may need to access resources to look up sensitive information or take tactical activities. Our systems are protecting access and securing the transmission. Another use case applies to discretionary access provision. A visiting federal service agent might require temporary, restricted access to a state or local municipality network resource during a local emergency. These are examples of enabling civic-ready secure access. It’s the ability to have multiple layers of policy from least to most restrictive and be able to activate and enforce that policy as needed.

In a military context, there is even more stringent security, resiliency and integration requirements. The policies are similar, however, in cases where you have multiple entities that are working as coalitions to carry out missions, which is where visibility, availability and response is crucial and interoperability comes to bear. This requires workflow management and secure access orchestration that combines strong authentication, endpoint security assurance, access enforcement, granular policy management, dynamic control application, operational visibility and automated response capabilities. In these situations, usability is about a lot more than just end user experience. Usability might mean the difference between life and death if participants can or cannot easily access the data they need to do their jobs.

IT organizations need operational visibility and the means to assure appropriate and protected resource and data access. Enforcing a security policy without negatively affecting user productivity requires a careful balancing act of process and technology. We provide the platform to allow organizations to gain and leverage secure access capability, while preserving user experience.

 

Scott Gordon is the Chief Marketing Officer at Pulse Secure

Opinion: What’s the rush on quantum-safe security? You already may be too late

By Scott Totzke, CEO & Co-Founder, ISARA Corporation

The dawn of the quantum computing era promises to fundamentally change the way we approach big problems – from researching cures for cancer to alleviating traffic in urban centers. But – and this is a very significant but –  large-scale quantum computing also has the potential to create catastrophic problems if we don’t take steps now to ensure that data such as financial transactions, medical histories and government records are protected with quantum-safe encryption.

One of the great accomplishments of the modern computing era is the ubiquity – and relative invisibility – of data security. Most of us communicate, transact business and share vital information without fear that the information will be compromised. Data security and encryption are seamlessly built into nearly every technological device at our disposal and we don’t even have to think about when encryption is happening.

A large-scale, general purpose quantum computer is expected to break today’s encryption with ease.

Although it’s estimated that large-scale quantum computers are seven to 10 years away from being powerful enough to break through current encryption standards, companies and governments are running out of time to prepare their networks and data from the quantum threat. This poses challenges for network administrators, executives and corporate boards – not to mention medical providers, military strategists and world leaders.

The reason is simple: Complexity. Today’s global networks are so interconnected that ensuring the security of data against a quantum threat requires a holistic approach that involves software vendors, hardware makers, customers and partners at virtually every level of the computing stack.

Ask a Chief Technology Officer or Chief Information Officer how long he or she needs to successfully implement even a relatively modest system upgrade and it’s almost always months or years rather than days or weeks. Taken on their own, the systems that manage identity and security for everything from online purchases to connected cars are complex, but when we see them becoming increasingly connected to each other the complexity gets even more significant.  This level of connectivity and interdependency underscores just how much of a security threat advances in quantum computing will pose to our existing infrastructure. Collectively, the technology industry has never faced an upgrade cycle this complex. Quantum is exponentially more complex than anything we’ve undertaken and the stakes are infinitely more significant.

For example, the quantum threat will almost exclusively be executed at the level of a hostile nation-state simply because large-scale quantum computers are bulky, expensive and, outside of North America, largely funded by foreign governments. We’ve all seen the damage smart, but loosely organized hacker groups can cause today by accessing Social Security numbers or other customer data. And with the last US presidential election, we caught hints of what organized cyberattacks by nation-states can look like even without piercing encrypted secrets.

These adversaries don’t mind playing the long game. We’re already witnessing instances of nation-states maliciously harvesting encrypted data that they plan to decrypt later with a quantum computer – essentially putting data confidentiality at risk within a decade. Top secret military and government files have at least 20-year privacy requirements.

Similarly, auto manufacturers that increasingly incorporate software in their vehicles are today putting in showrooms cars that will receive over the air software updates. Those cars still will be on the road when large-scale quantum computers arrive and those computers will be capable of compromising software updates.

The question security and risk management leaders need to ask themselves is how long it will realistically take to migrate to a quantum-safe environment. Getting to that answer and helping corporate or organizational leadership embrace it requires understanding a few key factors:

  • Where does encryption reside in your stack? Cryptography has become so ubiquitous that many security leaders don’t even know the distinct points at which they might be vulnerable. RSA, the current standard, has been around for decades – in many cases as long as an IT manager has held the position – and few technology leaders have even had to contemplate an entirely new approach to encryption. Only recently did the National Institute of Standards and Technology recommend moving to crypto-agility, the ability to quickly switch out cryptographic algorithms. Migrating a system to a quantum-safe state can’t be started until you understand exactly where it’s vulnerable.
  • Which partners and vendors do you rely on for systems or parts? After understanding the vulnerability points, many organizations will have to work with their vendors and partners to ensure the entire chain is quantum-safe. For example, a smartphone manufacturer installing a quantum-safe chip into new devices would need a chipset vendor that could produce a chip with quantum-safe cryptography embedded. That could take the chipset vendor three to five years to develop. Then it could take another two to three years to incorporate it into new products and manufacture them.
  • How adept is your organization at dealing with even routine changes? Every organization has its strengths and weaknesses. But few excel under haste. As the points above illustrate, preparing for a quantum threat requires a level of detail and planning many managers will find unprecedented. Understanding how an organization handles routine tasks such as updating things like access key cards tells you a lot of about your readiness for the task ahead.

No matter how prepared we think we are for the quantum era, it’s safe to assume it will be upon us before we currently estimate. Such is the history of technology. Two decades ago, the very notion of quantum computing seemed like a dream. Five years ago, it was viewed as utterly impractical. Today, separate teams around the world are on the cusp of achieving quantum supremacy – representing the first time a quantum computer will solve a problem that current supercomputers can’t.

That’s a major milestone. It should also be a wake-up call.

Global preparation to mitigate the threats posed by large-scale quantum computers will be extensive. And while we may not be able to pinpoint a specific date, we can say that the need to address this problem is an absolute certainty. Will we be ready? The time to start preparing is now.

Scott Totzke is Chief Executive Officer of ISARA Corporation, a Waterloo, Ontario-based security solutions company that offers companies and government agencies quantum-safe products and implementation tools.

 

RSA 2018 Wrap Up: Coffee is for Problem Solvers

Heading home from RSA 2018, my main reaction seems to be “wow!” What an incredible display of innovation and brainpower. There were so many startling solutions on display. Also, I really liked the vibe of the show. I’ve been to many enterprise technology conferences over the years and most of them have a hard-sell, “Coffee is for closers” tone. They’re about getting the big accounts to pony up the big money.

Of course, there’s nothing wrong with that. Security is a business, too, and there was plenty of selling going on at RSA. However, the subtext was different. Cyberattacks are a challenge, a national threat, even. People in the security industry are bound together by a sense of responsibility. There’s a shared feeling that it is up to us, to this industry, to protect the United States and other countries, industries, institutions and so forth, from cyber harm.

There’s also a sense of humility. Security people seldom pretend to have all the answers. Instead, coffee is for problem solvers, so to speak. Alec Baldwin would hate it at RSA. That’s okay. We have problems to solve.

 

RSA 2018 Highlights

I will be writing separately about the many fascinating companies I met at RSA. A few highlights stand out. Conversations with E&Y and PWC revealed that boards are growing far more comfortable with cyber security compared to even just a few years ago. Organizations are prepared to allocate more resources to security now that the risks to business strategies are better understood.

Several early-stage ventures from Israel shared impressive countermeasures. These include an automated, continuous red and blue team simulation, AI-based network monitoring and security solutions for connected cars. Another Israeli company is introducing a highly sophisticated user monitoring solution that can set rules and alerts for specific behaviors.

 

Trends on Display

I took this photo of myself by accident at RSA, but it actually captures the feeling of being there quite well, I think.

The use of artificial intelligence and machine learning emerged as one of the most significant trends at the show. This is not new, though the application of the technology seems to be gaining ground faster than ever. It’s at risk of becoming a bit of a fad, a “me too” phenomenon, but it is striking nonetheless. Everyone seems to recognize that there are simply too many data points to track when monitoring security. There must be machine-aided processes to help mitigate risks.

The role of insurance carriers also arose in several discussions at RSA. Though most agree it is early in the life cycle of cyber insurance, the feeling is that insurance companies will start to exert major influence on security policies and practices in the near future.

 

 

 

Are There Hardware Vulnerabilities in the Cyber Command?

Are there hardware vulnerabilities in the electronics used by the U.S. Cyber Command? That is the question I posed to several cyber security experts. Having read recently on Business Insider that computer monitors present an unexpected and often overlooked exposure to risk, I wondered what experienced security professionals would make of the image shown here. It’s a shot of the Cyber Command’s 624th Operations Center, which is where the Air Force conducts cyber ops.

 

A Shocking Photo

Several people told me I was irresponsible for even asking this question in public—that I should think twice before circulating such a photo. I understand the concern, but I am not the one who published it. The photo was posted on Military.com.

Still, the photo shocked several of my experts. Asher Dahan, CEO of Block Ransomware, commented, “It is a bit concerning to me coming from the Israeli military that in the US it is legal and allowed to take picture of Cyber security room and personnel.  In Israel you will find your place in jail for taking such pictures (all cameras disabled within security zones), and it will not make it to the web.”

 

Do COTS Products in the Military Have Hardware Vulnerabilities?

Are “Commercial Off the shelf” (COTS) hardware products risky for the military? Ondrej Krehel, CEO and Founder of LIFARS spoke to such potential hardware vulnerabilities, saying, “Since most of the manufacturing is conducted overseas, it is very unclear who screens electronic boards of these devices before they reach the customer. Just look at the hard disk drives. The NSA has ways to include malicious spying code embedded into the electronic chip.” Krehel also expressed concern about the software layer, citing an episode where Lenovo malware from Nation State actors was manipulated to spy on the end consumer.

According to David Dingwall, Senior Cybersecurity Strategist at HelpSystems, there is a risk, but it’s not very significant. He said, “Most of the hack possibilities are physical. If the hacking (country/organization) was willing to take time over months the best methods of attack is to pollute the inbound and outgoing logistics chain of replacement desktop devices. The photo shows a lot of consistency of equipment on all the desks, and the military have long multi-year procurement contracts requiring like-for-like replacements.”

Dingwall added, “Since this is a cyber-operations center, all devices’ screens, mice, keyboards, phones are attached with wires.  My working assumption is staff are monitored to not bring in cell phones, or anything in their pockets, and random searches are carried out.  Hacking live data in transit is therefore unlikely.”

 

That said, he was concerned about data storage, pointing out that keyboards have voids for more memory. He also noted that corrupted wiring could harvest mouse movement patterns, key tapping and pacing patterns on keyboards identifying biometric information about center staff that may be used elsewhere. Such an attack would require a custom hardware insert inside the device, or cable plugs. It is feasible, but it would take physical access to the site, or more likely the warehouse holding replacement equipment. Dingwall was concerned to facilitate swap in and out, however that “corrupted devices may be programmed to ‘fail’ with an intentionally higher failure rate than normal” and “swapping out devices may put the hacked device back in a less secure area for harvesting.”

Asher Dahan also pointed out that hacking a monitor like the ones shown in the photo require physical access to the device. The attacker would have to penetrate the monitor via the USB connector or to the HDMI connector in order for them to inject new code and reprogram firmware. Referencing the Business Insider article about monitor vulnerabilities, Dahan did express alarm that “the controller has no security to protect it from programing with anything one wish if they can reach the USB port.”

Physical Access Is Required to Hack This Hardware

Given that physical access is needed to hack the monitors or other devices in the photo, the risk to the Cyber Command is probably low. Still, with the potential vulnerabilities in the circuitry, it would seem that vigilance is required when dealing with foreign-made electronics in a sensitive national security context. With the volumes of hardware involved, it might be possible to miss a threat give the ratio of to signal to noise.

 

 

The Cyber Policy Sorta-Manifesto

cyber policyTech manifestos are often cringe-worthy acts of presumption, a harangue, a screech of superior attitude by people who haven’t earned the right to tell everyone else what to do. So, it was with some alarm that I found myself considering a manifesto of my own. Having spent nearly two decades involved in cyber security, however, I have reached a level of concern about our country’s vulnerability where I feel it is imperative to speak out. The following ideas comprise a sorta-manifesto on cyber policy, a high-level set of rules that will make the US safer from escalating cyberthreats. I don’t presume to have all the answers. I do hope to spark a meaningful dialogue.

 

Premise I: The Digitally-Connected World is an Engineering Failure

From the perspective of security, the digital connected world—consisting of the Internet, corporate systems, cloud infrastructure, connected mobile devices and the Internet of Things (IoT)—is an engineering failure.  This may sound impolite, but unfortunately, it’s the truth for anyone who has their eyes open. Virtually every networked device and system is subject to pervasive, extremely serious security problems. Epoch-making attacks are now commonplace. Data assumed to be private is routinely made public or stolen for improper use.

We would never accept this level of engineering failure from other systems we rely upon in our society. Can you imagine every car arriving from the factory containing a hidden incendiary device that may or may not explode at any time? Picture a city where thieves could get a key to your house at every corner store. Would you drive on a road with car-sized potholes on every block? How about an airliner that regularly denies its pilot control of the plane? How many people would choose to live in buildings that were negligently built to be deadly firetraps? (And, which come equipped with impossible-to-remove surveillance equipment that broadcasts every event in your private life to blackmailers and identity thieves.) Yet, we tolerate, even laud, a digitally connected world that embodies many analogous engineering flaws.

This is only a partial criticism of the people and companies who make the elements of the digitally connected world. I include myself in the industry. There is some legitimate blame to cast on the tech industry. But, everyone is working with the tools and materials at hand, with urgent profit incentives and a deeply flawed systemic design. The digitally connected world is a dangerous cocktail of rushed-to-market hardware and software, networks that were never intended to be secure and a decentralized, ungoverned global system of non-accountability. Given these factors, how could the digitally connected world not be insecure?

 

Premise II: The Societal and Human Risks are Immense

It’s easy to come off sounding like a paranoid lunatic in this department, but a careful reckoning of the systemic security risks we face is a sobering exercise. As books like Ted Koppel’s excellent “Lights Out” describe, the United States is vulnerable to catastrophic destruction due to security flaws in the electrical power grid. There are many comparable risks that are poorly managed, each of which could lead to mass chaos, death and destruction.

A short list of inadequately mitigated but deadly security risks includes: The “bricking” (permanent switching off) of millions of electronic devices through firmware- and software-borne malware; Contamination of critical data (e.g. financial records) through malware; Distortion of public information and on and on. A national-scale incident of this type could deprive hundreds of millions of Americans of power, water, fire and police services, telecommunications, medical care, sewage services, food, money and information. It could even render the military useless.

These scenarios are not the stuff of fevered Hollywood imaginations. They are actively being pursued by powerful nation states and terrorist organizations at this very moment. Almost all of our hardware and a significant amount of our critical software originates in countries that are strategic adversaries to the United States. These countries liberally exploit their ability to spy on us and implant destructive malware right in our pockets, server rooms, networks, vehicles and desktops. We’re they’re biggest customers. They’re not our friends.

 

Premise III: It Doesn’t Have to Be This Way

The truth is that America used to be a land of exploding cars, deadly highways and fire-trap buildings. Many of the same, “It’s not my fault. It’s the system.” types of excuses were employed to explain away thousands of preventable deaths from these dangers. Why do we no longer have such high risks in these engineered systems? Ignoring the politics of it for a moment, it’s fair to say that a great deal of effort went into rethinking the designs of cars, roads and buildings. The resulting ideas were then slowly, arduously translated into policies and laws that prevented needless death and destruction.

Today, though these systems are for from flawless, we have authorities, laws and penalties for breaches in the various codes that were enacted to protect people from poorly engineered products. We have mandatory car and fire insurance. There are industry standards: cars are built for safety; buildings are built to be fire-proof; roads are designed to avert accidents. There are governing bodies that monitor and enforce safety policies. Perhaps most importantly, the public mindset about safety is clear and positive. Safety is something that is supposed to be ensured, not avoided or rationalized. Lapses in safety are punishable by both civil and criminal law. The same needs to happen now for the digitally connected world.

 

Making It Happen with Cyber Policy

The United States needs a unifying cyber policy, a high-level set of rules, laws and norms that serve to remediate the serious security deficiencies in our digitally connected world. Devising such a policy, coming to consensus on it and then implementing it will be a monumental challenge. It may be the central governance struggle of the 21st century. Yet, it needs to be done. The risks of ignoring the danger are too high to bear. The following ideas could form the basis for a more extended conversation about forming a national cyber policy:

 

#1: Build a Secure National Network

The United States needs a secure, encrypted network mandated for use by industry, government and critical infrastructure such as power plants. No critical element of the US economy, government or public infrastructure should be allowed to conduct business of any kind over the public Internet. This network should be built using only hardware built in the United States. Any device connecting to it should be 100% American made. Any software accessible by the network needs to be scanned for malware or malicious code from unfriendly nation states. All users of this network have to be authenticated and authorized by a central authority governing use of the network. Locations of users must be verifiable, with strict controls over access to the network from overseas.

 

#2: Issue Licenses for Use of the Secure National Network

Users of the secure network can only access it once they are issued a license by a central controlling authority over the network. The licensing procedure includes criminal background checks, geographic location and more. With this license should come with a mandatory cyber insurance policy covering losses from security incidents. Violations of licensing policy ought to be criminal.

#3: Create Guidelines for Media and Public Information

As the events of 2016 show, the public is easily misled by deliberate manipulation of social media and other forms of public information. The news media would do well to devise and adhere to policies that limit the impact of unverifiable digital information sources, e.g. automated Twitterbots. Additionally, as it becomes simpler and cheaper to create false images and videos of real people (e.g. politicians) saying and doing things, there should be standards of reporting that make the news media less vulnerable to fraudulent stories.

#4: Make Data Harder to Steal and Less Valuable to Thieves

Data breaches will continue to plague the United States as long as the data itself has value. For example, being able to steal a social security number is a key element of identity theft. If it were possible to change social security numbers or render them useless without a personal PIN, the actual number would be a less attractive target for theft. On a related note, the practice of encryption of data at rest could help reduce the scope and frequency of data breaches.

#5: Make Data Storing Entities Legally Accountable for Breaches

The law needs to be strengthened to protect victims of data breaches. Entities that negligently enable hackers to steal valuable data, such as personally identifying information, have to be held legally accountable. This might even include criminal penalties for those responsible.

 

#6: Establish a National Cyber Authority

For any of this to work, there has to be some sort of national cyber authority. Whatever comprises this authority, whether it’s a government agency or a commission like the SEC or FCC, it has to have teeth. It has to be able to define and enforce national cyber policy to protect the American public from cyber risk.

 

Objections to the Idea of a National Cyber Policy

After we’ve gotten past the basic reaction of, “This will never happen,” it might be worth looking at some valid objections to the idea of a unifying, authority-based cyber policy governing American use of digitally connected technologies. These include:

  • It will be hacked. Of course it will. No system is completely secure. However, if cyber policy is implemented in a serious fashion, the probably, frequency and severity of attacks will drop. They will also become easier to remediate.
  • Such a policy will kill internet freedom. No, there can still be a largely ungoverned public internet used by non-authenticated users on insecure devices. Government and industry may not use this network, however.
  • It Will Slow Down Innovation. Not necessarily. Designing and building the systems contemplated by a national cyber policy could be the biggest innovation and profit-making opportunity of this entire era.
  • It Will Cost Too Much. Creating and implementing a national cyber policy will be a costly undertaking. However, it will be structured to benefit for-profit entities, so the cost is actually revenue to American tech companies. Done right, this policy should be a boon to American workers, hired to build secure, American-made technologies. Also, costly as opposed to what? To the hundreds of billions of dollars spent by businesses and government agencies trying in vain to defend themselves against foreign cyber armies? To the multi-billion-dollar costs of rectifying data breaches? As opposed to realistically facing the end of American life as we know it? What is that worth?

 

Now, we need to discuss.

The Need for a Unifying Cyber Policy

Would You Buy a Car with No Brakes? Me, neither. Yet, if we take a hard look at the many types and layers of digital technology that affect our lives, we might see how out of control we truly are. Take your average smart phone. It’s likely to be manufactured in a country the US considers a global strategic adversary. Its circuitry and software contain hidden code, installed at the behest of their intelligence service, that spies on us. In a cyberattack, this code can render the device useless. When it works, the phone connects to networks that are built using equipment made in this same adversarial country. They’re easily hacked. The phone can access corporate and government systems that, as most security managers know, have already been infiltrated by malicious actors.

This is just one example. Our lives are so dependent on digital technology we have stopped even thinking about it. Perhaps we never thought about. We should. Digital technology either runs or has decisive influence over our electrical power supply, food supply, healthcare, financial systems, government, businesses, transportation systems, law enforcement agencies, military and intelligence services. Digital software and hardware are embedded in cars, medical equipment, tools, planes and on and on.

It’s all very slick. It makes our lives easier. It’s also extremely vulnerable to disruption. Our entire reality can easily be thrown into unimaginable, fatal chaos. The risks are far more serious than a simple data breach or loss of service. It may sound hyperbolic, but the survival of our entire society and way of life is at stake. Who’s in control? No one. The current, well-intentioned practices known as “Information Security” or “Cyber defense” are inadequate to mitigate the systemic risk we face.

The increasing tempo and severity of cyberattacks reveal the deficiency of current cyber defenses. These deficiencies exist despite the investment of money and expertise by some of our greatest minds. At the same time, newly exposed cyber vulnerabilities, such as the potential for the power grid to be destroyed by hacking, suggest that we have barely begun to confront what are truly existential threats.

To prevent cyber-borne disaster, the time has come to develop a higher level, more holistic set of rules—a Cyber Policy—that unifies the security and use of digital technology by business, consumers, government, military, media and beyond. We need a high-level, holistic set of rules to govern the pervasive computing systems that run virtually every aspect of modern life.

Getting to such a Cyber Policy would be a Herculean task, but one that must be attempted nonetheless. The underlying challenge will be to get key stakeholders to recognize that organizations, leadership and rules are equally, if not more important that technologies in addressing cyber risks. If agreement on this principle can be reached, then the truly hard work begins.

At a high level, forming Cyber Policy requires conversations among thought leaders from across the technology spectrum regarding what Cyber Policy should embody and how it should be developed. There is a need for a governing body to coordinate policy setting, with commitments to operationalize policies across corporate, legislative and public-sector entities. This body must address the technological aspects of cyber policy implementation – how tooling, standards and frameworks can come together to define and enforce Cyber Policy. It must also deal with organizational and Legislative aspects of Cyber Policy. There have to be “teeth” in Cyber Policy. Voluntary frameworks are, by definition, ineffective in the modern world. Cyber Policy must be real and enforceable.

Cyber Policy presents a leadership challenge. Is the United States up to the job? Can it afford not to be?